Report of Kamgar Ekta Committee (KEC) Correspondent
On 17th June, 2024, a goods train collided with Kanchenjunga Express between Rangapani and Chattar Hat stations in West Bengal. The loco pilot (LP) of the goods train, the train manager of the express train and 14 passengers were killed and nearly 50 injured. Immediately after the accident, the CEO and Chairperson of the Railway Board blamed the deceased LP of the goods train even before the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) had given its official report!
After this accident, KEC along with 11 central trade unions and railway organisations had issued a joint statement demanding accountability of Ministers and other high authorities for the large number of preventable accidents in the Indian Railways resulting in deaths, injuries and loss of public property!
The CRS submitted its preliminary report on 11th July, 2024. The Commissioner stated that what happened on 17th June, 2024 was “AN-ACCIDENT-IN – WAITING”. It completely debunked the claim of the Chairman and CEO of the Railway Board.
The report said improper instructions along with inadequate counselling of train running and operations staff was one of the reasons of the accident.
The CRS said there is an urgent need to overhaul train operations across Indian Railways to prevent such accidents from recurring. It also said that frequent malfunctioning of automatic signaling was defeating the purpose of deploying them.
The probe found that inadequate permissions were issued to loco pilots on the day of accident. Crucial instructions such as enforcing speed limits on trains were not explicitly stated while allowing movement on routes where automatic signalling had failed, said the report.
It said that there was inadequate counselling of loco pilots and station masters about train operations in automatic signalling territory, creating misinterpretation and misunderstanding of rules.
The CRS submitted its final report on the accident on 30th September, 2024. In its report on the causes of the accident it said “The accident happened due to lapses at multiple levels in managing the train operations under Automatic Signal failures.”
This includes an error in
- Issue of T/A 912 instead of T/D912 in case of all Signals failure violating the provision of SR 9.12/1.
- Non-availability of critical safety equipment (Walkie-Talkie) with the loco pilot and train manager of DN GFCJ
- Inadequate counseling of Loco Pilots and Station Masters about train operation in Automatic signaling territory creating misinterpretation and misunderstanding of Rules .
He said that this accident is classified under the category of “Error in Train Working”.
The CRS made the following recommendations with a view to achieve safe train operations:
- The large number of signalling failures in automatic signalling territory is a cause of concern and should be taken up with RDSO and OEMs to improve the reliability of the system.
- Introduction of new Auto signalling sections should commensurate with the provision of Automatic Train Protection. Further, the necessity of Auto Signalling in the Non- Suburban section shall be reviewed considering the limited number of train movements in the non-suburban section.
- The occurrence of as many as 208 cases of Signal Passing at Danger from 1.4.2019 to 31.03.2024, out of which 12 cases resulted in collision, highlights the limitations of preventive measures taken by the Zonal Railways (counselling of Loco Pilot/Assistant Loco Pilot, safety drives, etc.). This underscores the need for the implementation of the Automatic Train-protection system (KAVACH) on top priority. Use of non- signalling-based systems such as Artificial Intelligence based detection of the RED aspect of the signal and providing an early warning to the Loco Pilot/GPS-based anti- collision systems shall be explored for provision in locomotive cabs across Indian Railways in non-ATP territory.
- Availability of walkie-talkie sets, being the safety critical equipment, to all Loco Pilots & Train Managers of all the trains shall be ensured all the time. For this purpose, if required, necessary changes in the procurement policy shall be affected.
- The GR (General Rules) was issued by the Railway Board in the year 1976, since then lot of changes have taken place in the GR. There is a need to revise and re-issue the GR. Further, the corresponding SR (subsidiary rules) is varying across the Zonal Railways. There is a need to bring uniformity in the SR of Zonal Railways by the Railway Board to the maximum extent possible.
- The provisions of SR related to automatic signalling territory shall be reviewed in regard of the applicability of various operating forms (T/A 912, T/B 912, T/C 912, T/D 912).
- Any changes in GR and SR should be vetted by the safety wing of the Railway Board/concerned Zone for the elimination of any ambiguity/clash with other rules.
- Crash worthiness feature of the passenger coaches shall be reviewed in reference to standard EN-15227. On priority, at least the last two coaches of every passenger carrying train should have crash-worthiness feature as per standard EN-15227. All new coaches should be turned out with crash-worthiness features and existing coaches shall be retro-fitted during major schedules of coaches. It is noted that around 500 ICF coaches of different types have been manufactured with crash-worthiness features. These coaches shall be converted into SLR coaches and attached at either end of the rake to minimize loss of human life and Railway property in case of collision.
In short, the CRS report re-emphasizes that “there is an urgent need to overhaul train operations across Indian Railways to prevent such accidents from recurring.”